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III.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff/Appellee,

American

States

Insurance,

in

its

Appellee's Brief, has completely failed to address any of the
relevant facts, law or arguments.

Instead, it asserts that the

whole matter depends upon whether or not Split Mountain Construction is, in fact, a partnership -- something Appellant/Defendant
Deborah Turney has never ever disputed.

This appeal is not about

form of business.

It is about the construction of a particular

insurance

provision

policy

regarding

underinsured

motorist

coverage. Additionally, plaintiff offers no cogent reason why this
court should not hold that Joseph Price was a "family member."
Thus, this Court should reverse not only the granting of plaintiff's

motion

for

summary

judgment,

but

also

the

denial

of

defendant's cross-motion.
IV.
ARGUMENT
A.

Plaintiff Has Failed to Show That John Turnev Was Not A Named
Insured,
This

case

is

about

construing

the

policy's

underinsured

motorist provision in light of plaintiff's decision to list John
Turney -- as an individual and by name -- as a named insured.

As

to this issue, Appellee's Brief is more significant for what it
omits than for what it includes.

It does not discuss the relevant

policy provision or cite to any case involving insurance law.
1

It

mentions unrelated policy provisions and cites to partnership law.
It does not discuss the "real question" of whether or not Turney
was a named insured, or address most of the arguments made in
Appellant's Brief.
POINT 1

This Appeal Turns upon the Language of the Policy.

Plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action in response
to defendant's claim under the underinsured motorist provision of
the policy in question (R. 0075).

Thus, it is rather astonishing

that

even mention

Appellee's

Brief

does

Instead, plaintiff discusses

not

to

different

provision.

(and even quotes) from the general

commercial liability provision.
relates

that

See Appellee's Br., p. 3.

coverage

and

uses

different

This

language.

Defendant agrees that there is no general commercial liability
coverage for the non-business activities of family members.

Her

claim,

for

however,

relates

to

separately

described

coverage

injuries caused by an underinsured motorist.
Ironically,
underinsured

the

motorist

differences
provision

between
and

the

the

language

general

of

the

commercial

liability provision undermine, rather than support, plaintiff's
position.

The general commercial liability coverage is expressly

limited to matters involving the conduct of the business, whereas
the underinsured motorist coverage is not.

The general commercial

liability provision makes no reference to "family members" (only
spouses), whereas the underinsured motorist provision provides
2

"family member" coverage.1
if

"you" simply

Moreover, this family coverage applies

"are" an individual

(R. 0075) .

commercial provision uses the different phrase,

The general
lf

[i]f you are

designated in the Declaration as. . . ." (R. 0072.)
Defendant's construction of the relevant policy provision
stands unrebutted on this appeal.

Accordingly, this Court should

reverse.
POINT 2

Plaintiff has Failed to Show that Form of Business is a
Relevant Issue,

Notwithstanding its insistence, that form of business is the
decisive issue, plaintiff fails to identify any policy language
which supports that position.

Nothing in the policy either condi-

tions or limits underinsured motorist coverage based upon form of
business.

According to the plain language of the policy, this

coverage depends solely upon who is a "Named Insured Shown in the
Declaration" (R. 0070 & 0075) . See, Christiansen v. Holiday RentA-Car, 845 P.2d 1316, 1318

(Utah App. 1992)

(identity of named

insureds depends upon who is listed as such in declaration) . John
Turney

is individually

listed as a "Named Insured."

Indeed,

although he is listed along with Split Mountain on the first
declaration, it is the partnership, rather than the individuals,
x

It is also interesting that the general commercial coverage
is the same for partnerships and sole proprietorships -- the
principal (s) and spouse(s) . Discussing a provision, which makes no
distinction between partnership and sole proprietorship, seems a
bit inconsistent with the theory that form of business in the one
and only issue.
3

which is omitted from the subsequent declarations -- including the
underinsured motorist declaration.
Plaintiff also cites to no law showing that form of business
is relevant here.

Plaintiff cites statutes and cases defining

"partnership" and "joint venture."

See, Appellee's Br. p. 4.

It

cites cases holding that partnerships are separate legal entities
for some purposes.

See, Appellee's Br., p.5.

Defendant does not

dispute these propositions -- she disputes their relevancy here.
See, Appellant's Br., pp. 11-14.

Split Mountain was a partnership

which (for certain purposes) had an existence separate and distinct
from Mssrs. Turney and Slaugh.
partnership

That proves nothing.

law precludes an insurer

No aspect of

from covering

individual

partners instead of, or in addition to, the partnership. No aspect
of partnership law creates a presumption that an insurance policy
covers the partnership rather than the partners or both.

Nothing

in the law cited by plaintiff makes form of business relevant or
controlling as to who or what is being insured, which is the issue
here.
POINT 3

Plaintiff has Failed to Refute the Arguments Made by
Defendant,

Plaintiff makes a half-hearted attempt to distinguish two of
the many cases cited by defendant.

See, Appellee's Br., p.5

(discussing Carlson v. Doekson Gross, Inc., 373 N.W.2d 902 (N.D.
1985) and O'Hanlan v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 639 F.2d

4

(3rd Cir. 1981)).2

1019

Otherwise, plaintiff neither discusses

defendant's cases nor cites any authority involving insurance law.
Plaintiff does not even cite to the cases which it cited below -perhaps, because they are not in point, as defendant has asserted.
See, Appellant's Br., pp. 16-18.

Plaintiff, in particular, fails

to address the only case in point -- namely, Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Co. v. Huddleston, 514 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. App. 1974), in
which the court held that a policy naming only the partnership
covered family members of the partners.

See, Appellant's Br., pp.

12-13, 17.
In Huddleston, supra, and the other cases cited by defendant,
the courts allowed family member coverage in circumstances which
were significantly less compelling than those presented here.

In

these cases, no individual was listed as a named insured, but only
the corporation or partnership.

Here, Turney was listed.

At the

very least, that creates an ambiguity which must be resolved in
favor of coverage.

See, United States Fidelity & Guaranty v.

Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah 1993).

Plaintiff does not dispute this

rule or that this policy is ambiguous and confusing.

The real

issue here is how a reasonable lay person would understand and
interpret the policy.

See, Sandt, 854 P.2d at 523-25.

Plaintiff

does not dispute that a reasonable insured would understand the
2

Defendant cited these cases for the definition of the term
"d/b/a." See, Appellant's Br., pp. 9-10. She acknowledged that
they involved sole proprietorships, but noted that such distinction does not affect the meaning of "d/b/a." Id.
5

policy to provide underinsured motorist coverage to the family
members of John Turney.
POINT 4

Plaintiff Does Not Deny that it Could Have Easily Made it
Clear that Price was not Covered.

Defendant noted several ways in which plaintiff could have
easily

altered

the

language

of

the

policy

to

accomplish the result for which it now contends.

unequivocally
Plaintiff's

complete failure to respond leaves a number of interesting and
critical questions unanswered.

These are questions which the

drafter of the policy should be able to answer.

In the final

analysis, the lack of any answer to these questions is, perhaps,
the most powerful reason for reversal.
Why was John Turney shown in the declaration as a Named
Insured, if it was intended that he not be a named insured?

If the

partnership was intended to be the only named insured, why did
plaintiff

not

list

only

Split

Mountain

Construction?

If

underinsured motorist coverage for family members is available only
to a sole proprietorship, why does that provision use the phrase
"if you are an individual," instead of "if you are doing business
as a sole proprietor?"

If coverage depends upon form of business,

why does the policy not state as much directly?

Indeed, if a

partnership policy is not intended to provide any family member

6

coverage, why does it even contain a provision which refers to
"family members?"3
This was a confusing and ambiguous policy, which could have
been easily clarified.

The plaintiff, as the insurer, must bear

the burden of having failed to do so.

See, Government Employees

Insurance Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 1982); Sandt, 854
P.2d at 522.
B.

This Court Should Not Only Reverse The Judgment For Plaintiff,
But Also The Denial of Defendants Cross-Motion.
Plaintiff virtually concedes that, if this Court reverses the

judgment, it should also mandate that judgment be entered for
defendant.

Plaintiff does not contend that it has any extrinsic

evidence which would support its interpretation and which should be
considered on remand. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of
defendant, as a matter of law.

See, Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522.

Plaintiff does not contend that its mere assertion, that Price
did not reside with Turney, is sufficient to raise an issue of
fact.

See,

in this

Appellant's Br., p. 20.

regard,

is that

Plaintiff's only contention,

defendant's affidavit

as to Price's

residence should not be considered because it was unsigned when
filed.

See, Appellee's Br., p. 7.

Defendant has already fully

advised this Court as to that circumstance.
3

See, Appellant's Br.,

As noted, several courts have held that a policy which refers
to family member coverage, but provides none, is inherently
ambiguous. See, King v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 519 N.E.2d 1380
(Ohio 1988) and authorities cited at Appellant's Br., pp. 15-16.
7

p. 2, n.l & p. 19, n.4. Although an unsigned affidavit was filed at
first, a signed affidavit was filed and served two days later (R.
0185) . This was almost four months prior to the hearing on the
parties' motions.

A two-day delay, months before hearing, is not

even significant, much less prejudicial.

Indeed, the trial court

did not strike this evidence or hold it to be inadmissable, and
there is no basis for doing so now.
V.
CONCLUSION
The separate legal status of partnerships in general is not a
sufficient basis upon which to sustain the judgment for plaintiff.
Even if that point has some bearing upon the real issue of construing

the relevant

dispositive.

policy

provisions,

it

is

certainly

not

Yet, it is the only argument urged by the plaintiff.

Accordingly,

the decision

of the

trial

court

should

be

reversed, and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment
for the defendant, or in the alternative, for trial.
DATED this

day of July, 1997.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for/£^ain£^S»

By:

f ft^S* {.S
J. BRADFORD DEBRY

8

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT (American States v. Turney) was
mailed, postage prepaid, this

/f^h

following:

Kendall Hatch
DUNN & DUNN
230 South 500 East, #460
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

8874.RPL

9

day of July, 1997 to the

